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ABSTRACT

The history oturban policing paints an evolutionary picture describing the
i

■

'

variousforcesthatinjipinged on society's earliest efforts atpublic policing and led to
numerous reforms ciilminating in what has been termed the professional model of
i

'

.

.
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policing. The dynaniics ofan ever-changing urban society continued to present new
challenges to policing and have driven police administrators and politicians to seek new
methods ofresponding to society's criminal element. The evolution continues today
I ■

■

■

.

.

,

with our latest response to the problem ofcrime; namely,Community Oriented
Policing. By far the most popular movement in policing today,COP attempts to change
the very culture ofthe modem urban police department through a stmctural as well as

functional reorganization ofthat department. The goal is to tighten the bonds between
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•

■

police officer and citijzen thereby involving conmumity residents in solving their
,.

■

.

i

'■

■

,

particular neighborhood problems. Initial results depict a broad mix ofsuccesses with

intermittent failures; yet,the movement continues to gain popularity in nearly all
quarters including memy ofthe nation's Air Force communities. While numerous

installations begin iniplementing components ofCOP,there is some concem they are
doing so without questioning the applicability ofCOP in the military community.
Several unique characteristics ofthe Air Force community diminish the need for COP

while atthe same timje making those communities idealfor implementation ofCOP
tactics. In particular,Ithe strong informal social controls existing at most AF
installations strongly reduce the need for formal police controls. An exploratory survey

111

suggests that while many Air Force Security Police units are committed to COP,the
individuals working the programs may not fully imderstand all that COP entails or that
Air Force SP units actually began performing many community oriented services years
before the COP movement took hold. Further research into which areas ofCOP would

benefit the military community the most and which programs are not necessary is

recommended. Additionally,close monitoring ofcivilian programs and efforts at
community policing,especially those in rural America is encouraged.
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Chapter 1
The Enduring Problem ofCrime
It was once noted that"crime should have been added to death and taxes as

inevitable facts oflife(Stephens,1992,p. 19)." Indeed,the problem ofcrime seems to
be as enduring as humankind itself. While one need not search very far before
uncovering ample evidence of the perpetual nature ofcriminal activity, historically

speaking,our responses to crime have varied widely over time,and as Sherman(1995)
points out,the phenomenon we know as police patrolling was relatively unknown
during the pastthousand years and before the substantial police reforms ofearly British

police history,citizens,in one form or another,generally policed themselves. In spite of
historical facts such as these, it is easy to understand how Americans today, who have

known no other system ofcriminaljustice,assume that the modem image ofpolicing,
■
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perpetuated and stereotyped in the media,is as abiding as crime itself. In the questfor
crime control, responseshave been varied and often hastily concocted in response to
some pressing critical issue—only to be repudiatedjust as quickly when results were

not speedily forthcoming. One analogy offered compares society's responses to the
crime problem to that ofcrash dieting. Every now and then,someone touts a new
"miracle cure" which turns out to be anything but a cure,and in mtoy cases only serves

to exacerbate the problem(Walker,1994;p. 12). Whether the solution is selective

incapacitation,determinate sentencing,a war on crime, a w^on drugs,or any one ofa
number ofcontemporary solutions to the crime problem, our responses seem more like

crisis managementthan thoughtfully proposed and researched programs ofcrime
fighting(Byrne,Lurigio, & Petersilia, 1992).

Politicians and police practitioners themselves are partly to blame for this
fi-enzied search for a solution to the crime problem. As pointed out by Cochran(1992),

a staple ofmost politician's running platforms is to "gettough on crime" which,of
course,inaplies that we are not yettough enough. In addition,getting tough usually

implies attempting new law enforcementtechniques,reducing the number of
"technicalities" which may be used by criminal defense lawyers,adding more police to
the streets,or otherwise "unleashing the cops,"none ofwhich,research has shown,will

do much to reduce the crirne problem(Walker, 1994). Others have pointed out that

police administrators have become quite adept at burning the candle at both ends;that
is, both rising as well as falling crime rates have long been successfully used by police
administrators asjustification for more police funding in spite ofthe fact that available

research has shown that police,in and ofthemselves,cannot do much about the crime

problem(Willimns,F.P.Ill, & Wagoner,C.P., 1992). While one would suspect that
people Would eventually realize that most crime repression programs have had little

effect on die crime problem,Gochrah(1992)points out that the symbolic nature ofeach
new program overshadows the lack ofsubstance with the previous programs. It is

suggested that,as long as politicians and practitioners keep churning out new laws and
programs faster than the failings ofpast programs can be comprehended,the end to the
furious search for an effective response will remain outofsight.

Community Oriented Policing: Our Latest Response
When it comes to law enforcement,the response to crime drawing the most attention

over the past several years is Community Oriented Policing(COP). It has been"touted
as the only form ofpolicing available for anyone who seeks to improve police

operations, management,or relations with the public"(Rosenbaum & Lurigio, 1994).
In addition, as Rosenbaum,Yeh,and Wilkinson(1994)have pointed out,it would seem

those critical ofthe change to community policing are becoming somewhat ofan

endangered species as"police chiefs and public officials have stopped asking questions
and have startedjumping on the bandwagon"(p. 331). Citing President Clinton's

Fiscal 1994 budget, which includes $50 million for state and local government

implementation ofCOP programs,Roberg(1994)points outthat even though there is
little, ifany,hard,empirical evidence that COP reduces crime,it"appears to be a done
deal"(p.254). Results from a National Center For Community Policing 1993 survey

support these conclusions by demonstrating that42 percent ofall large departments
(those servingjurisdictions of50,000 or more)and 98 percent ofsmall departments

surveyed(those servingjurisdictions ofless than 50,OOO)reported having some kind of
COP program(Trojanowicz, 1994). More recentstatistics show that the movement's

popularity is growing unabated: Department ofJustice,NIJ,figures show that atthe
end of1994, out of15,000 departments which servejurisdictions of50,000 or more,a
full 9,000 applied for federal funding in support oftheir ongoing or planned community
policing programs. Certainly, Kelling's(1988)comments about COP being a"...
quiet revolution[which]is reshaping American policing"seem right on target(p. 1).
3

This"quiet revolution" has not gone unnoticed by the nation's military leaders

either. Ever vigilant in detecting evolving police technologies or procedures which may
benefit military communities. US Air Force(USAF)Security Police commanders have

already implemented components ofCOP at various military installations throughout
the country. More are planned for the future,and while this interest in COP is certainly
laudable,assuming it has merit as an effective response to the crime problem,there is
some risk involved injumping on the COP bandwagon without prior assessment ofits

need or applicability within the USAF community. For one,as more and more USAF
Security Police(SP)units feel the need to get in line with the growing movement,some
ofthese units will undoubtedly attempt to do so even though they may be less-than

adequately equipped to successfully manage the necessary changes. Because the

existing research on community policing's effectiveness already constitutes a mixed
bag,continued program failures, outside ofor within the military community,could
prove problematic for the movement's life expectancy. The result may be program
abortions even though failures may stem from poor implementation strategies rather
than from the use offaulty concepts.

Prohlem Statement and Overview

Before any USAF SP commander embarks on a quest to implement community

policing it would seem wise to assess the logical fit ofcommunity policing with the
military community and its unique culture. Is the military already doing community
policing but under a different name? What aspects ofcommunity policing are
4

applicable to military communities? Does the philosophy underlying community
policing mesh with that oftraditional military police work? To the extent that

community policing would require structural changes within departments,is the military
ready or able to implement the necessary changes? How much change is required by

community policing in USAF SP departmental culture and philosophy in order to be

successful in the military? What community policing programs could be effectively

used by military commanders? Finally,are there any lessons to be learned from
military policing programs and philosophy which would benefit civilian departments as
they endeavor to implement community policing? These constitutejust some ofthe

questions which need to be addressed in order to afford any community policing effort
the best possible chance for success.
In an attemptto answer the foregoing questions,three areas ofconcem for
USAF Security Police(SP)commanders and leaders will be explored in an effort to

determine the potential value ofCOP for military communities as well as identify any

possible risks or other areas ofparticular concem. First, the question ofa need for a
complete philosophical shift to COP within the USAF military community environment
will be addressed. Next,the overall fit ofthe COP model ofpolicing and the military
policing model will be exeimined to see if some restructuring emd reculturalization of

the military police organization is necessary before COP has any chance ofsuccessful
implementation. Finally,the possibility ofa segmented implementation ofCOP in the
military community will be explored;that is, an attempt will be made to determine

which components,ifany,ofCOP have the greatest applicability(and,hence the
greatest chance for success)in the military environment.

Chapter Two will provide an overview ofour traditional modelofpolicing
including an analysis ofthe driving forces which forged(and are continuing to forge)
this model. Chapter Three will focus on the COP model beginning with a description

ofsome ofthe major motivating forces and following with a definition ofCOP as well
as a briefreview ofseveral contemporary efforts. It is hoped that this portrait ofCOP

will clearly illustrate the magnitude ofthe effort level required for a true shift in

departmentalculture prerequisite to full implementation ofCOP. In Chapter Four,a
sketch ofthe tradition ofmilitary policing will be presented,focusing on its roots,
mission,and similarities(as well as dissimilarities)with the traditional model of

policing. In addition,the question ofa need for COP in the Air Force will be addressed
focusing on the unique environment ofthe military community. The major reasons why
COP may have some implementation problems will be discussed along with some
considersations which might be addressed in pursuing COP implementation in the Air
Force. Fihally,an outline ofthe results ofsome exploratory research into what is

currently being done at several USAF bases with respect to COP will be presented. The

examples presented will further demonstrate how a selective application ofCOP in the
military community may be the method most likely to meet with success. Chapter
Five will summarize the research and include some discussion about,and

recommendations for, future inquiry and research.

Methodology and Limitations

A literature review will provide historical and contemporary information

concerning the development and current status of the various philosophies ofpolicing.
A number ofwriters have elaborated on the roots ofcontemporary policing, beginning

with the British foundations and continuing with the American adaptations. These
writers discuss the political,economical,and social forces ofthe times which served as

catalysts for change(Crank, 1994; Critchley, 1967; Moore & Kelling, 1983; Sherman
1995; Silver, 1967; Sparrow,Moore,& Kennedy, 1990; Trojanowicz& Bucqueroux,

1990). Similarly,the literature is replete with explanations ofthe forces which have,in

part,helped to shape the current trend toward community policing(Crank, 1994; Eck &
Rosenbaum,1994; Roberg,1994; Rosenbaum & Lurigio, 1994; Turner & Wiatrowski,
1995).

While Trojanowicz& Bucqueroux(1990)stand out as leaders in defining

community oriented policing,there are numerous others who address the issues of
philosophy and definitions(Brown,1989; Capowich & Roehl, 1994; Greene &
Decker, 1989; Kratcoski & Dukes,1995;Rosenbaum & Lurigio, 1994; Sparrow, 1988;

Sparrow,Moore,& Kennedy,1990; Walker, 1994;). In addition to describing or
attempting to explain what community policing entails, others, meanwhile,have also
focused on evaluation ofexisting programs as well as the myriad ofimplementation

issues associated with changing a well-ingrained police culture(Brown,1989;
Capowich & Roehl, 1994; Greene & Decker, 1989; Greene,Bergman,& McLaughlin,
1994; Kratcoski& Dukes, 1995; McLaughlin& Donahue, 1995; Moore,1994;
7

Murphy,1988; Rosenbaum & Lurigio, 1994;Sadd &Grinc,1994; Skolnick &
Bayley, 1988;Thurman & Bogen,1993; Walker, 1994; Weisel& Eck, 1994;

Wilkinson & Rosenbaum,1994; Wycoff& Skogan,1994). Finally,the concept of
community and its inherent limitations with regard to an organized response to crime is
addressed by Buerger(1994).

Because there remains some ambiguity surrounding community policing and its

precise definition,any material presented and conclusions drawn from that material will
necessarily be based on the definitiori presented by the author for this work. With
regard to the history and tradition ofmilitary policing,the literature is scant;therefore,
many ofthe observations made concerning USAF SP traditions and practices are drawn

from the author's own personal experience as a USAF SP officer covering a period of
approximately nine years.
An exploratory survey will draw information from USAF SP personnelto

formulate a picture ofwhat is being done today regarding commuhity policing,in an
attempt to measure the extent ofthe movement's popularity at the unit level. This

survey will be conducted by telephone and willconsist ofa sample drawn from the

population composed ofall USAF SP units within the continental United States. The
results ofthis survey should provide some useful examples ofwhat is currently being
done in various military police units or what is projected for short-term implementation.
The survey results which will be used in the thesis are not intended to be a

representative example of all SP units. Differences in laws,customs,andjurisdictional
authority makes generalization beyond the United States impossible,while differences
8

between units' missions,locations,and headquarters-generated operational guidelines

makes comparison across units within the United States difficult as well. Therefore,the
nature and intent ofthe survey is to discover which(ifany)COP activities are being

performed by a variety ofunits, with the results used strictly for descriptive purposes.
In this work,no attempt is made to gauge the ability ofmilitary personnel(from

an aptitude or attitude perspective)to make the change to community oriented policing
or to unnecessarily compare the military with their civilian coimterparts in terms of

success probabilities. The differences between military and civilian police units,in
terms ofcomposition,mission,and environment,arejudged as being too great to make
any realistically meaningful comparisons.

Chapter!

Traditional Policing
The traditional model ofpolicing(or professional model as it has been also

termed), has evolved over a number ofyears in response to a variety offactors.
Because the community policing model is somewhat ofa natural outgrowth or

progression ofthe traditional model, we begin with a review ofthe traditional model
and briefly describe how it came into being,including some ofthe most significant
historical social,economic,technological, and political factors which influenced its
evolution.

From Public Servant To Professional Crime Fighter:
The Evolution of the Traditional Model ofPolicing

The professional, or traditional model ofpolicing is characterized by a quasimilitary command and control structure which seeks to maximize the strengths ofpolice

officers as professional crime fighters. The typical modem police department is a
highly centralized organization where decision making is mostly vertical and uni
directional(top-down); bureaucratic in nature,it employs multiple levels ofsupervision

and management,detailed rules and prescriptive regulations,and seeks to packagejobs

into neat,simple sets ofspecific responsibilities. This stmcture and form of
management has as its primary purpose the unification ofefforttoward the commonly
defined goal ofcrime control. It also affords a strong mechanism for maintaining strict
accountability ofits officers,and is designed to promote the type ofproductivity on
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which the relative success ofthe organization is measured: numbers ofarrests,calls

handled,and containment ofPartI Index Crime rates. The evolution ofthis structure

and the management style which accompanies it solved a myriad ofproblemsfaced by
early American urban police departments. A briefreview ofsome ofthe major
developments which helped forge this traditional model ofpolicing will provide a better
understanding ofits underlying philosophy.

Public Policing: A New Response To An Old Problem
To the British ofthe time,the establishment of the Metropolitan Police District

in 1829 represented a profound divergence from the status quo. Previously, the

responsibility for policing rested primarily with the people themselves,who,relying on
a system in which non-paid volunteers served as watchmen,would respond to the hue
and cry and band together in apprehending violators ofthe law. Citizens were grouped
together into tithes,hundreds, shires,and parishes and then held responsible for the
capture ofcriminals who came from their various groups(Critchley, 1967). As the
country became more industrialized and the populations ofthe largest cities grew,crime
and disorder also increased and posed a greater set ofproblems to citizens and industries
alike. In an effort to contain the criminal element and minimize its impact on business,

various private police organizations formed,the earliest ofthese being Henry
Fielding's Bow Street Runners;however, being mostly reactionary in nature,the
Runners' success in investigating and solving crimes still hinged on public involvement

(Moore & Kelling, 1983). Increasing urbanization and industrialization continued to

11
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exacerbate the crime problem as the population of the poor and seemingly lawless,
known as the"dangerous classes," began to swell in the most highly populated cities.

After nearly a century ofattempted reform,society became increasingly alarmed
with,and aware of, the encroaching disorder and the ineffectiveness ofthe traditional

parish system.Thus the stage was set for change and a more radical response to the
crime problem. Silver(1967)points outthat complaints ofthe day regarding rising
crime and disorder in London were strikingly similar to the contemporary lamenting we

hear as people anguish over how best to handle our own urban crime problems. The

perception was that crime and disorder had simply taken On new dimensions and the
"traditional" methods ofthe time appeared inadequate to deal with them. Public

recourse in handling the problem left much to be desired: either rely on an ineffective

and fragmented system ofwatchmen and private police or turn to the militia which had

proven itself all too "bloodily effectual"in its past encounters with disorder(Sparrow,
Moore,& Kennedy, 1990).

Againstthis setting ofdisorder and the sense ofdesperation for a solution to the
crisis. Sir RobertPeel brought into being the London Municipal Police Act of 1829
which for the first time drew together the efforts Ofpolicing under one head in an

attempt to organize and professionalize the fight against crime. Critchley(1967)points
out that Peel's task was not a simple one. The general citizenry and parliament had

vociferously resisted previous attempts at organizing police forces on the grounds that
the concept ran counter to everything then believed about a citizen's rightto liberty.
The fact that the Act passed without any dissent(Trojanowicz& Bucqueroux, 1990)
12

suggests^at a pervasive beliefexisted that

had to be done,some other

response was needed,with regard to die growing crime problem. Gritchley(1967)

continues,citing the convergence ofa variety offactors,over an extended period of
time,as leading up to the opportune momentfor passage ofthe Metropolitan Police Act.

These factors included the work ofthe Fielding brothersne^ly a century earlier, which
raised the level ofawareness about crime and its implications;the works ofColquhoun

and Bentham and the influence they had on public opinion; the lost confidence in the
existing parish system with its wholly incompetent watchmen;a Prime Minister

(Wellington)who favored using police forces rather than conventional army troops; and
the political opposition being"bought off(p.49). Silver(1967)notes that the change
was seen as necessary and,in fact, was welcomed by most ofthe upper,or"propertied,"

class as it largely relieved them ofthe day-to-day responsibility for policing while still
allowing them control over who was to be policed and how the policing was to be done.
In addition, whatever fears the upper class may have had oflosing liberty at the hands of

a public police force was more than offset by the increasing lack ofcivility on the part
ofthe"dangerous classes."

The newly founded response to crime was not without its problems and growing

pains; a fact not surprising in light ofthe many obstacles and problems faced by the
fledgling "Met." The citizenry's general opposition to any formal organization ofa
police force was compounded by the fact that,as Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux(1990)
point out, many ofthe newly appointed constables came from the ranks ofthe old
watchmen and brought their corrupt practices with them. In addition to the disrespect

shown the police by the citizens,low pay tended to magnify the temptations to give in
to corraption and also resulted in a high rate ofturnover. Finally, the sheer demands of
thejob(keeping order in an environmentfull ofdisorder)further exacerbated the

problem ofmaintaining good workers. In the end,however, it was the Met's
persistence and demonstrated restraint(in contrast to the military mentality of"shoot
first,ask questions later"), and the eventual control ofthe "riotous element" which
caused public support to eventually swing in favor ofthe Bobbies and allow this new
response to crime to continue developing.

America's Response: Following England's Lead

Ifthe British reformers had little in the way ofprecedent upon which to build

their police organizations,the colonists in America had even less,so it was only natural
that America's urban response to a growing crime problem was largely patterned after

the British response. Earlier efforts favored the watchman system and,as in England,
C.
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;
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this system soon became ineffective as urban Americans became afflicted with the same

problems endemic to urban London. The formal effort to professionalize the police

force,then,generally followed London's lead, with one notable exception: The British
system was set up under a central office which reported to a member ofthe Prime
Minister's Cabinet, while the American police departments were set upimder individual

municipalities and therefore were less insulated from the corrupting influences oflocal
party politics'-^Not surprisingly,this vulnerability was exploited by politicians who
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brazenly used the police as political tools in furthering their own ambitions and
agendas:
"Police chiefs came and went with mayors,precincts were laid out to be

contiguous with political wards,and precinctcaptains worked hand in hand with
ward leaders. Power within departments was extremely decentralized, with
precinct captains directing,hiring,and firing their men,often atthe behest of
local party captains(whose frequent close connection with crime bosses often
meant that convicted felons ended up as police officers). When the mayoralty
changed parties,it was notimusual for the entire police department to be fired
and replaced by supporters ofthe new victors." (Sparrow et al., 1990,p.33)

The opportunities for corruption were magnified by the fact that police officers
routinely carried out numerous functions,such as issuing licenses for a wide variety of
businesses,all ofwhich created a system where it was nearly impossible to avoid

corruption:"Even honest cops who where nottempted by monetary bribes could do

little to defy a system where such licenses were dispensed as political favors

(Trojanowicz& Bucqueroux,1990, p.48)f Early American police thusfound
themselves wearing a variety ofhats depending on the needs ofthe situation; with few

other public agencies around,the police became the ones to turn to when faced with
nearly any problem,crime related or not. Whatever benefits may have been derived
from the service orientation ofthe early American police were soon overshadowed by a

growing sense ofuneasiness; that is, owing to the seemingly haphazard organizational
structure ofmost mid-1800s police departments and the instability oftheir political
supporters,people naturally questioned the authority ofthe police and eyed them with a
measure ofsuspicion(Moore & Kelling, 1983). Sparrow et al.(1990)likewise point

out that in spite ofthe positive aspects ofthe police system in the middle to latter halfof
15

the 19th century,the demand for police reform continued to grow as corruption and

abuses ofpower became increasingly widespread. Three ofthe more significant social
issues which spurred the early reform movement were a perceived lack ofcrime control,

the view that the police were major obstacles in the way ofpolitical reform,and the

perception ofmany that the"moral pollution" within the cities was a direct result of
police refusal to enforce vice laws(Sparrow et al. 1990,p.34; Moore & Kelling, 1983).
Indeed,it seemed that police corruption became as significant a concern as the crime

problem itself,thus setting the stage for continuing reform with regard to the way cities
were policed.

While the reformers' developments gave the police more power in defining their
role and function in society as well as clarifying the response to crime,it did not give

them complete autonomy from political influence. Subsequent efforts at reform often
came in the form ofblue ribbon panels which focused more on other aspects ofpolice

corruption. The Lexow commission in 1894 exposed some ofthe well-ingrained police
corruption in New York City,and these findings served as a catalyst for numerous other
commission investigations throughout the United States. Years later,the Wickersham
Commission further solidified reform efforts and, pointing to the lack ofcompetence

and training ofmost police officers, gave renewed motivation to the concept ofpolice
professionalization.' The dynamic efforts ofleaders like J. Edgar Hoover and August
Volmer helped formulate the framework for what would come to be accepted as the role
and function ofpolice in society. Hoover,especially,taught reform-era administrators

the benefit ofdefining one's role and selling that to the public rather than allowing
16

others determine what one's role should be(Trojanowicz& Bucqueroux, 1990).
Technology(most significantly the advent ofthe patrol car and mobile radios),the 911

system,and expanding use ofthe Uniform Crime Reports all continued to solidify the
image and role ofpolice as society's professional crime fighters and our first line of
defense(and offense)against the omnipresent problem ofcrime.

In short,industrialization andurbanization during the 19th and 20th centuries
created crime and disorder problems ofa magnitude and type never before encountered.
Traditional law enforcement responses ofthe time simply were not effective and,once
the problems encountered grew sufficiently large enough to create a feeling that

something had to be changed,reforms were initiated. Later changes and modifications
to policing were similarly driven by the perception ofproblems which the existing
system did not seem to handle. Once the principle role ofcrime control wasformed,

and the Mage ofthe professional crime fighter created,the police became less and less
involved with services and duties not directly related to law enforcement, and any
changes(including those teehnologically driven)were pursued largely in order to
enhance the police's ability to fit that image and enhance the organizational structure
and management style which had been espoused. The overarching factor involved
throughout the various stages ofpolice reform has been the"need factor." Without a
strong impetus for change which this need factor provided,the reform efforts would

most likely have stalled,lacking the necessary momentum required to overcome the
considerable inertia presented by the reigning status quo.
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Chapter 3

Turning Back To The Community

Some may argue that community policing is taking us back to policing's roots;
however,when viewing the history ofpolicing from an evolutionary perspective,one
senses that currenttrends appear to represent a continuation ofthat evolution rather than

a swinging ofthe pendulum back to another era. While the changes that led to the
professional model ofpolicing were necessary and fitting for the time in which they
occurred,some ofthe professional model's inherent weaknesses became more apparent

over time when faced with a perpetually changing environment. In particular,the rift

between the police and the public whom they served(which began to grow as patrol
officers moved from the foot beatto the car)grew wider as the police and citizens

became increasingly distant and distrustful ofeach other(Moore & Relling, 1983). As
problems with police-community relations increased to crisis proportions,the search for
a response to this new problehi began to gain momentum.
As such,the ongoing search for alternatives to the professional model of

policing generally has followed the same pattern ofchange witnessed during the early
reform years;that is,ftie current attempts at community policing are in response to a
new set ofchallenges resulting from some ineffectiveness oftraditional policing. Thus,

in a sense,perhaps the community policing movementis multi-directional: In part,the
pendulum is swinging back to a day when patrol officers were moreinvolved,one-on
one,with the citizens whom they serve; however,in another sense, policing is simply

proceeding with its evolution as society continues to grapple with the ever-growing and
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changing problem ofcrime control. A briefexamination ofthe more importantfactors
leading up to the current shift toward commimity policing will help further clarifyjust
how public and political pressures combine to create an environment conducive to
change.

The Beginning ofThe End

Even as the professionalization ofpolicing seemed to reach its zenith in terms of
rapid response and the crime fighter image reformers had worked so hard to create,the
public began to question the effectiveness ofits police forces(Moore & Kelling, 1989).

Aside from the perception that crime was growing rampant during the 1960s, Crank

(1994)cites several concrete events which brought the legitimacy ofthe primary police
mission(protecting the public and fighting crime)under question. Crank includes(1)
increasing urban unrest and widespread protests ofthe Vietnam War,which tended to
show a police force unprepared to handle these situations;(2)assassinations ofthe
Kennedy brothers and Martin Luther King,Jr.;(3)Chicago Police Department

shootings ofBlack Panther leaders;(4)the 1964 and 1968 presidential elections, which

spotlighted the street crime issue for the first time on a national level;(5)the American
Bar Foimdation's study ofthe criminaljustice system,which was published in die
1960s and exposed a police force that did not apply the law in an equal maimer;(6)

Miranda and other Supreme Court rulings, which bolstered the growing distrust ofa
police force perceived as abusive ofits discretionary power;(7)and,finally,the highly

publicized Kemer Commission and President's Crime Commission reports that
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summarized and formally stated many problems endemic to policing ofthe time while
at the same time making an official call for drastic reform. The combination ofthese

factors created a crisis sufficiently strong that people began to .. question the
fundamental purpose ofthe [police] organization itself(Crank, 1994,p. 327).
Simile to the call for change which preceded police reform around the turn of

the century,the 1960s movement was also based on a perception ofproblems within

policing and a perceived ineffectiveness ofcurrent police strategies. No single event
triggered these changes,rather it was the culmination ofnumerous incidents which

finally resulted in a sense pfcrisis and the perception ofa social problem significant

enough to demand change.; The President's Grime Commission findings and
recommendations for a shift in police strategy were based on data gleaned from

previous studies on policing and the impetus provided by the political and public
climate which were clamoring for change. This official call for change was important if

for no other reason than it served as the catalyst for police introspection and further
research.

The President's Crime Commissions' call to turn the police back to the

communities by improving police-community relations spurred some practitioners to
seek alternative approaches in dealing with thejoint problems ofcrime and social
unrest. Some ofthe earliest efforts involved Team Policing—a program designed to get

officers back on the beat and foster greater communication between officers and
community residents. HoWever,by and large,these efforts failed because ofmid-level
management resistance and a general preoccupation on the part ofthe police with what
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has been called a"means over ends syndrome";that is,the police were more concerned

with appearing to be doing something in the way ofcommunity relations rather than
trying to actually solve some community problems(Roberg, 1994; Rosenbaum &

Lurigio,1994;p.303). Mostother early attempts atimproving commimity-police
relations similarly failed because ofinternal resistance vsdth departments only going

through the motions, or faulty implementation tied to a poor fit between organizational
structure and program implementation. Rather than investigate the reasons for poor
results, the tendency was to discreditthe entire idea;thus,early attempts at alternative

models for policing became collateral casualties offailed demonstration projects

(Rosenbaum & Lurigio, 1994). Whatever the causes ofthese failures,the tide of

change continued to move along,occasionally injected with new life from anecdotal
success stories or,more significantly,some highly publicized events which again
focused on the negative aspect oftraditional policing and re-invigorated the cry for
change.

Continuing Changes

Ofthe more consequential events which keptthe ball rolling in the questfor
crime control alternatives were the Kansas City Preventive Patrol and Rapid Response

experiments ofthe early 1970s. While previous efforts at reform may have been
hampered by a less-than-enthusiastic cadre ofpolice administrators who dabbled with
change(at least,cosmetic change)as a result ofpolitical and media pressure,the results
ofthe Kansas City experiments virtually destroyed some ofthe more basic assumptions
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ofthe professional model and gave administrators even less reason to hang on to the
status quo(Turner& Wiatrowski, 1995). The fact that the police operated for so long
assuming preventive patrol and rapid response to be the cornerstones ofpolicing(and,
hence,crime control)is not snrprising when one considers the underlying raison d'etre

for traditional patrol procedures. The prevailing style and procedures were adopted

primarily because they dovetailed so nicely with the accepted management style,
organizational structure,and adopted role ofthe police departments and not because
they had been empirically tested and found to be effective. The impact ofthe Kansas

City experiments was that they narrowed down the general complaints ofpolice
ineffectiveness and for the first time objectively pointed to areas where police could

make changes. Their collective strength lay not in exposing a new alternative, but
rather in demonstrating to jjractitioners and researchers alike what didn't work.

Whereas public opinion and commission findings generalized problems with policing
and indicated change was necessary,focused research proyided greater insight and

produced more internal motivation for police departments to make substmitive changes.
Some other events which continued to fuel the fire ofchange include the

continued politicization ofcrime brought to center stage with catchy slogans such as the
"War on Drugs"and the highlighting ofcases such as Willie Horton; media exposure
about corruption or other problems in some prominent police departments

(Philadelphia,Los Angeles); and controversial police tactics such as the"bombing"of
the MOVE headquarters in Philadelphia and the Rodney King beating in Los Angeles.
In addition, while recent commissions charged with investigating urban police
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departments(Philadelphia in 1987 and Los Angeles in 1991)cite the ineffectiveness of
traditional policing in dealing with the crime problem,the events which triggered the
investigations revolved around the use offorce(incidentally,against a minority)and the

endless complaints about police

in dealing with minorities(Eck & Rosenbaum,

1994).

Again,similar forces are seen as precipitating the change cycle: shifts in police

policy with regard to the appropriate function for police have been largely fueled by
significant events which capture the heart and imagination ofthe public. Where
research has been applied to changes in police strategy,it has followed the cry for

change and has filled a more indirect,albeit an important,role by demonstrating what
doesn't work. But moving from what doesn't work to what does work is much more

difficult—^both in the realm oftheory as well as in pructipe. Efforts in community

policing throughoutthe 1980s and into the'90s were grounded more in ideas and
anecdotal evidence than in any solid,theory-based rese^ch. Nevertheless,the

momentum grows unabated as federal funding for police initiatives is increasingly being
tied to community policing(U.S.Dept Of Justice Fact Sheet, 1994)and COP continues
to wind its way down the road to becoming a veritable institution(Crank, 1994).

A Working Definition
Since the time ofthe President's Crime Commission reports,there have been

numerous forays into aspects ofcommunity policing,some ofwhich have met with
success while others have failed. There has also been considerable confusion overjust
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what constitutes COP. Atthe center ofthe confusion is the predominate failure to

differentiate between strategy and tactics. While COP in its purestform encompasses a

complete philosophy ^d therefore transcends tacticalprograms,these programs
nevertheless have captured most ofthe attention. Ofthe more enduring experiments

which have somehow survived the years oftrial and error and remain the most prevalent
in the literature, mini-stations,foot/bike patrol.Neighborhood Watch and other crime

prevention programs,civilianization,and permanent beat assignment ofofficers are the
most well known and used.

Tactical Programs

Mini-stations are perhaps the most direct effort at structural decentralization of
the police department. By bringing the police department directly to the affected
neighborhoods,the mini or sub-stations provide community residents with greater

access to the police. The underlying hope is to foster rapport,encourage citizen
involvement,and afford the police officers that have been assigned to the mini-station

greater familiarity with t/ic/r assigned beats (Trojanovdcz& Bucqueroux, 1990).
While most mini-Stations are set up to operate in fixed structures,some cities have
experimented using converted vans that have the added advantage ofbeing able to move

throughoutthe cohimunity ona setrotation(Sadd & Grihc, 1994). In both cases,
departments have solicited successfully for citizen volunteers who fulfill various
administrative tasks in the mini-stations.
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Similar to mini-stations,foot/bike patrols are used in an effort to bridge the gap

between patrol officers and community residents. The patrol officer on foot or bicycle
becomes more accessible to the average citizen than the officer operating his/her patrol

vehicle. Likewise,once patrol officers are out oftheir vehicles,they are more likely to

solicit help from and engage in conversation with community residents.

Neighborhood Watch and similar crime prevention programs,civilianization of
certain police respohsibilities,and permanent beat assignment ofofficers are all used to
maximize the effectiveness ofthe primary community policing initiatives discussed

above. Neighborhood Watch extends the eyes and ears ofthe police department by

increasing the number ofpeople who report crime or potential problem areas. The key
again is citizen involvement which is further facilitated tlurough the permanent
assignment ofofficers to a specific beat. With time,the familiarity ofthe officers
reassures community residents and increases citizen involvement(Sadd & Grinc, 1994).
Civilianization ofcertain administrative functions within police departments frees up

sworn officers who are then assigned to the community where they can have a more

direct impact on community policing efforts. Each ofthese programs has the

overarching goal ofcitizen involvement based on the premise that only through
community Organization and citizen support can crime be effectively curtailed. While
the evidence to supportthis notion is still somewhat scant,some have reasoned that this

may be due to insufficient research(Eck & Rosenbaum,1994),and that there seem to be
at least five solid ways that community residents can positively effect efforts at crime
control. First, citizens can watch and report more actively. Second,they can actively
25

patrol and identify problem areas for police officers. Third,they can alter their own
behavior and thereby make the community more crime resistant. Fourth,the united
voice ofcitizens can provide the necessary pressure on politicians and others in power
in order to affect necessary changes. Fifth,citizens can authorize officers to act in their

behalfrather thmi making the task ofthe police officer more difficult by secondguessing arid criticizing police actions.

COP Strategv

However varied and expansive the definitions ofcommunity policing may be,
Moore(1994)points out that it is importantto keep a proper perspective on what

community policing is and what it is not. He suggests it is more than operational
programs,reforais iri administration,or situational tactics; rather,commimity policing is
all ofthe above and then some; in short,it is nothing less than "strategic innovation"(p.

290). Community policing then,is better seen as"a collection ofstrategies that share a
commonphilosophy or setofprinciples aboutthe desiredrole ofpolice in society
[italics added]"(Rosenbaum & Lurigio, 1994,p. 302). That shared philosophy
emphasizes police accovmtability and responsiveness to the communities which they
serve,a commitment to helping communities help themselves,and seeing the police-

citizen relationship in a more interactive light(Skogan,1990,as cited in Rosenbaum &
Lurigio, 1994).

While increased citizen involvement is one primary goal ofcommunity policing

efforts,and the programs that have been described are some ofthe most prevalent
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means used to solicit that involvement, none ofthem,individually, constitutes

conummity policing. Some have even suggested that existing research demonstrates

that ifcommunity policing is implemented as an "isolated change within the police
department it will not work"(Sadd & Grinc, 1994,p.41). Others have attempted to
show how some ofthe more popular tactics which are Often defined as community

policing are nothing more dian an attempt to use a different tool in the contextofa
traditional policing strategy(Gordner, 1994). Yet true community policing,at a
minimum,is supported by,even designed in concert with,residents ofthe affected
communities. Indeed,community policing radically alters the status quo by changing

the role ofpolice officer from "crime fighter"to "problem solver" and the relationship

between citizens and officers to one of "partnership"(Sadd & Grinc, 1994). By casting
the police officer in a more generalist role,COP reduces the specialization ofthe police
officer that was generated in the reform years and perfected throughout the

professionalization era. This generalist role goes beyond targeting only those problems
that are perceived as directly related to crime control and illuminates other factors that

impact a community's quality oflife. The COP philosophy attempts to insert the police
officer into the community and make him or her a part ofthe community in hopes of
creating the type ofenvironmentfound in many rural towns:

Rural and small town police are closer to their commimity than are urban police.
Rural and small town police are a part ofthe local culture and community,
whereas urban police tend to form a subculture and move apart from the
commimity....Urban police tend to be efficient; rural police tend to be
effective.(Weisheit et al., 1994. p.554)
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In this type ofenvironment,the police officers,as well as ail citizens and any
other public service agents who interact in the community,are among those who make
up the fabric ofthe community. Thus COP attenipts to create and foster a sense of
community that transcends geographic boundaries. This aspect ofcommunity policing

has led some to propose that the best way to distinguish the real thing from programs

merely masquerading as such,isto examine whether implementation efforts have raised
the level ofcommunity participation and,ultimately,increased citizen satisfaction with
police services. (Skolnick & Bayley, 1988).
COP is also not the same as Problem Oriented Policing(POP). Capowich&

Roehl(1994),point outPOP and COP both came into being at about the same time and
arejust as often seen working together as not. While both COP and POP involve

problem solving(that is,they both shift the locus ofpolice activity from a means to an
ends orientation), COP first and foremostfocuses on the community and any problems
endemic to that community,whereas POP identifies problems first and then includes the
relevant community in its solution. In this light, it may be argued that POP becomes
another ofthe many tactical programs that fall under the umbrella ofCOP. Finally,a

parade ofscholars and practitioners have enumerated the identifying details of
community policing and the distinction between it and other programs which commonly
are seen as community policing(Brown,1989; Greene & Decker, 1989; Kratcoski &
Dukes, 1995; Rosenbaum & Lurigio, 1994;Sparrow et al., 1990; Trojanowicz&
Bucqueroux, 1990).
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Distinguishing between strategy and tactics when discussing COP is one ofthe
primary problems associated with implementation ofcommunity policing. More than
merely a new program or tactic for police officers to use in their role as crime fighters,it
involves an almost paradigmatic shift in that role. It encourages proactivity instead of

reactivity, problem solving instead of symptom managing,line officer innovation
instead ofdogmatic rule following. Whereas tactics merely change the way police
respond to crime,strategy seeks to change the entire relationship between police and

citizens by making them partners in identifying and solving community problems. The
more effectively police officers can be integrated as members ofthe community,the
better this new partnership with community residents is expected to function.
But in order to effectively activate this new role in police officers and the

citizen-police partnership,there are concomitant changes which must occur in both the
organizational structure and the very culture ofany department seeking to implement
COP. Before examining these management implications, however,a briefreview of

several studies will highlight some ofdie ambiguity surrounding the effectiveness of
community policing while at the same time more clearly substantiating the notion that

COP is more thanjust a passing fad—that it is,a concept with considerable staying
power.

Effectiveness Review

As the briefdescription ofcommunity policing above demonstrates,the concept
covers a broad realm ofactivities,strategies,and fundamental changes in the perception
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ofcrime. As such, it is no surprise that there has been some degree ofdifficulty in its

successful implementation. Regardless,practitioners and researchers alike continue to

work at bringing the reality ofcommunity policing a bit closer. As a result ofthe

growing popularity ofcommunity policing,reports ofsuccessful(and failed)
implementation efforts from a variety ofperspectives abound. While the attempt to

synthesize these efforts is not the main purpose ofthis paper,there are some valuable
lessonsto be learned from even a cursory glance at some ofthe existing reports.

Sadd & Grinc(1994),in a report on community policing efforts across eight

cities including,among others New York,Houston,and Portland,OR,found widely

diverging results from the various projects with respectto drug trafficking, drug-related
crimes,fear ofcrime,community-police relations,and community involvement. While

some cities reported marked differences in drug problems and fear ofcrime,others did
not,and all cities showed relatively little impact ofthe programs on community

involvement. The only area ofconsiderable agreement was that ofpolice-community
relations, which all cities noted as being at least somewhat better. The evaluators

attributed the differences to varying levels ofeducation(both on the part ofthe police
and the community residents)conceming community policing's goals and blamed the

lack ofcommxmity involvement as stemming in part from the programs all being
viewed as"police initiatives" and notinvolving other city agencies(p. 50).
In Spokane, WA,a special project which was evaluated imder the rubric of

community policing, was found to have been generally successful, both in the eyes of
officers and community residents,in providing alternative programs and outlooks for
30

some ofthe city's most socio-economically disadvantaged youths. The findings,
however,were very present-oriented and would require long-term follow up to

substantiate any lasting benefits(Thurman & Bogen,1993). Seattle, WA,was able to
gain voter approval for increased funding and resources to support city-wide

implementation ofcommunity policing based on the success oftheir program,a major

part ofwhich was attributed to strong community involvementfrom the point of
program inception(National Institute ofJustice, 1992). On the other hand,Skogan
(1994)cited an implementation effort which resulted in the transfer ofthe district
commander and the replacement ofthe ChiefofPolice largely because ofover
zealousness with community policing to the pointofletting basic services slip. A study

in Toronto(Murphy,1988)found that community policing may be overrated and

traditional policing overly maligned. It included a suggestion that community policing
may be more effectively viewed as a modification,rather than a replacement,of
traditional policing.

Other studies have focused on the personnel aspect ofcommunity policing to

include factors such asjob satisfaction,skill perceptions,acceptance ofthe commvmity

policing philosophy,and perceptions ofcommunity residents,with findings varying
considerably both across sites and categories(Greene,1989; Lurigio & Skogan,1994;
Rosenbaum et al., 1994; Wilson & Bennet,1994; Wycoff& Skogan, 1994; Weisel &

Eck,1994). One ofthese studies,in Madison,Wisconsin, produced some interesting
results. The implementation ofcommunity policing was approached rather indirectly
with the emphasis during the firsttwo years exclusively on incorporating "quality
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policing"(based on Edwards Demming's management principles), throughout the
organization(Wycoff& Skogan, 1994). The hypothesis presented was that community
policing, which involves a fundamental shift in management philosophy,could not be

successfully implemented withoutthe quality management approach fully ingrained
throughout the department first. Interestingly, after the second year,survey findings

revealed some positive changes regarding citizens' perceptions of the police
department—all without any overt emphasis on community policing projects. These
findings suggest that attitudes involved with professional policing,and notjust tactics,
may be the biggest problem ofthe traditional approach. The findings also generally

support die results ofthe Toronto study.
Even a briefreview^ such as presented here,is enough to paint a kaleidoscopic
picture ofthe community policing movement with its myriad approaches and results. It

points outthat the empirical evidence that might supportthe viability of community
policing is,at best, incdnsistent. Nevertheless,the community policing movement
continues to grow. One ofthe reasons for this sustained commitment to community

policing may lie in its relationship to contemporary management philosophies. Just as
the move toward police professionalization, with all that it entailed, was forged in part

by the prevailing management philosophy ofthe time and solved the most pressing
policing issues ofthe day,the move toward community policing is shaped by the larger
movementtoward quality,or participatory, management. As such,it solves one ofthe
most troublesome issues concerning policing in the days since the President's Crime

Commission;namely,that ofpolice-community relations(Eck & Rosenbaum, 1994).
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In addition,as Crank(1994)points out,the nature ofconimunity policing allows it to be

used by both liberals and conservatives alike to further theirpolar agendas. While
conservatives focus on conimunity policing's order maintenance approach,liberals

favor the community organizing aspects ofthe movementthereby affording substantial

supportfor COP from all comers. Eck & Rosenbaum'S"plastic concept,"commimity
policing seems to have the necessary flexibility to weather assaults from all fronts and
still survive(1994,p. 3).

Buerger(1994)cites three reasons why many continue. Quixotic-like,to strive
after community policing. He suggeststhe movement continues to be fueled by what
Goldstein(1979,1990)dubbed the"means over ends syndrome"and that police are

guilty ofcelebrating the many small successes(means)while ignoring the ultimate

impact(ends). Second, Buerger calls attention to the factthat the movement enjoys the
benefit ofa large deposit ofpre-packaged solutions and terminology that have
accumulated over the years as a result Ofthe many community relations and anti-crime
programs ofthe past that have been lauded for their successes(even those successes
were based on short-term results). The final reason for community policing's

continuing popularity provided by Buerger is simply the lack ofany feasible alternative
solutions. The result is a concept robustness which implies that community policing
will be with us for a considerable time to come in spite ofthe fact that a concrete

solution,or blueprint for implementation,may yet be well in the future.
Implied as well is the warning to forward-looking administrators to prepare to
change. Ifevidence indicating favorable trends as a result ofcommunity policing
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efforts continues to mount, there will surely be more and more pressure from citizens'

groups,politicians,and eventually peers to get on board and accept the new policies.
Additionally,the "plastic" nature of die COP philosophy may well allow it to be used
by other public service agencies. The underlying theme ofhelping communities to help

themselves,coupled with the goal ofbridging the police-community rift,is equally

applicable to all services. Across the spectrum ofpublic service agencies,the ideas
embodied in the COP philosophy can be effectively used to enhance community
relations and thereby improve the quality oflife. From this perspective. Community
Oriented Po//cmg'may well be a misnomer; while the orientation is certainly toward
community,the applicability reaches far beyond the realm ofpolicing. For

practitioners, anticipating these eventualities and preparing now for the future will
increase the likelihood ofsuccessfully leading organizations through the changes which
lie ahead—especially in light ofthe magnitude ofthe changes required for full
implementation ofCOP. These necessary preparations and organizational changes
require discussion in order to illustrate the enormity ofthe challenges facing

contemporary police(as well as other)administrators who are committed to
implementing community oriented programs.

Kevs to Successful Change

As previously mentioned,the reformers who followed the classical style of
management in restructuring early American urban police departments were able to
solve numerous problems which had beset those departments. However,as Kelling,
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Wasserman,& Williams(1988)point out,the classical management approach did not
come without its drawbacks. Specifically,they cite the diverse nature ofthe patrol

officer'sjob,which defies detailed proscription and simplification,and the fact that
when on patrol officers are rarely imder any direct supervision. The classical approach
to management would serve to limit discretion in an arena where discretion is a

fundamental necessity for success. This"[discontinuity]between organizational

prescriptions and work realities"is seen not only as creating problems for
administrators, but for the officers as well, who are subjected to "considerable role

strain" by being "portrayed as professionals on the one hand but treated as recalcitrant
semi-skilled workers on the other"(p.2). The impact ofthese administrative
consistencies has been to create,along with the centralized command and control

structure so typical today,a strong line officer subculture in most police departments
which relies on informal rules,emphasizes watching out for other line officers,
discourages formal innovation,and pulls line officers away from both supervisors and
the citizens whom they are called to serve into a tightly knit circle ofsolidarity (p. 3).

The concept ofcommunity policing attempts to rectify the strains created by the
classical management approach by moving the police organization toward a more
participative management style. Scholars and practitioners have stressed the need for
several fundamental organizational shifts under this participatory management style,
including:(1)a power shift, which hinges on decentralization and the displacement of
discretion out to the line officer;(2)a training shift emphasizing two-way teaching
methodologies with a focus on,among other things,problem identification and problem
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solving; and(3)an evaluation shift turning toward innovative thinking and problem
solving as the basis for reward and promotion(Roberg,1994; Moore & Stephens, 1991,
as cited in Wilkinson &Rosenbaum,1994). These three M-eas deserve further

discussion to clarify both their interdependent nature as well as the level ofeffort
involved in making the change to COP.

Decentralization

One ofthe most commonly referred to necessities for community policing is the

notion ofdecentralization,including its implications for participatory management and

empowerment ofline officers. The focus ofcommxmity policing(identifying and
solving problems at the community level through greater interaction between officers

and citizens)implicitly suggests a need to niove operations out to the community in
order to strengthen community ties. For this reason,perhaps,nearly all community

policing attempts involve some level ofdecentralization; at a minimum,the majority
seem to encompass some type ofUiini-station system in the effort to bridge the physical
and emotional gap between officers and citizens. In a cross-site analysis presented by
Weisel & Eck(1994),it wasfound that while none ofthe six programs evaluated

involved any "formal decentralization"(in the sense offlattening out the entire

departmental structure),they all emphasized more responsibility and increased decisionmaking authority for officers along geographic lines;that is,out to the point where the
demonstration projects were being run(p.65). Similarly,an overall implementation
survey conducted in Florida in 1989 found that mini-stations and permanent beat
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assignmentfor officers were two prominent components which all COP efforts had in
common(Greene, 1993). Wycoff& Skogan(1994),reporting on one ofthe most
successful examples ofcommunity policing implementation to date,cited the actual

geographic and functional decentralization ofthe department as being particularly
difficult. Bonds between departments and personnel that had been forged over the years

were suddenly disrupted as work centers and responsibilities were shifted. Strained,as
well, was the mutual trust that had fomied through fi^equent face-to-face
communication. In spite ofthese challenges,the researchers noted that the geographic
and functional deCentrali:^tion was generally supported and seen as necessary by
departmental personnel.

So,while the need for decentralization appears to be an implicit assumption for

those moving toward COP,it does not come without its costs. Complaints about a

"splitforce"and a mid-level management perception ofa loss ofpower associated with
decentralization are noted as significant obstacles by some(Pate & Shtull, 1994;
Roberg, 1994; Wilkinson & Rosenbaum, 1994).

Training

As suggested earlier in this work,ignorance concerning what constitutes
community policing has engendered confusion surrounding its implementation. This
confusion has often become a source of resistance both within police departments as
well as within the communities where implementation has been attempted. Where
there has not been active resistance,there has been at least apathy,which might be
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interpreted as passive resistance. In either situation,departmental and community
resident training is crucial to overcoming the resistance factor(Sadd & Grinc, 1994).
While police training has been increasingly emphasized during the past century,
modem training programs focus almost exclusively on"adherence to law and discipline

and very little on situational problem solving" (Kelling et al., 1988,p. 5). In contrast,
COP requires a very different set oftools,and thus must be approached from a different
training perspective. Roberg(1994)stresses the importance ofmoving to a more
interactive teaching style, which incorporates both instmctors and students in an

exchange ofanalytical reasoning,problem identification,and problem solving. In

supportofthis notion, Wilkinson & Rosenbaihn(1994)suggestthat much ofthis
training is more suited for the field than the classroom. Lee Brown,former Chiefofthe

Houston Police Department,emphasized the need to attack training at all levels-—
recruiting, cadet,officer,supervisor,and management—with a focus on specific
information needs and skills required at each level(Brown, 1989). McLaughlin &
Donahue(1995)report on one department's successful training approach, which
confronted the training issue in seven phases covering areas from COP,POP,and
neighborhood organizing,to tactical crirne analysis,crime prevention surveying,and

city ordinances. The scope ofthese training areas further highlights the complexity and
nature ofthe skills needed for successful COP. In short,there must be both substantive

and style changes in training at all levels within the department and the affected
communities before any meaningful increase in knowledge,skills, and results can occur.
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Evaluation and Reward

No organization can ever hope to sustain changes in its structure or operational
philosophy without incorporating supporting mechanisms which reward personnel for
work toward desired goals. Sparrow(1988)points out that in most traditional police
departments,officers are required to follow rules, not to exercisejudgment and

discretion. Citing the voluminous departmental regulation manuals which attempt to
attempt to address every conceivable situation in which officers may find themselves.
Sparrow describes tliis regulation-rich environment as one where"there is little

incentive and little time to think,or to have ideas. There is little creativity and very

little problem solving. Most ofthe day is taken upjust trying not to make mistakes"(p.
4). This type of mentality and reward system runs counter to everything COP hopes to
achieve.

There is some evidence that departments have been able to successfully

implement new evaluation systems which emphasize officer discretion,innovation,
problem solving,and proactivity,and thereby become value- rather than rule-driven

(Roberg, 1994; Sparrow, 1988; Trojanowicz& Bucqueroux, 1990). However,there are
some who argue that the police cannot disregard such standard measures of
effectiveness as response time or arrest rates without bringing imbearable public

dissatisfaction and pressure to bear. While there are cases to support this contention
(Skogan, 1994),there is also evidence suggesting that the 911 issue and the demands it

places on officers may be exaggerated and that it is a wholly manageable problem

(Kessler, 1993). Fiarthermore,it is argued that police departments have misled
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themselves into believing that their official measures ofpolice effectiveness are
synonymous with citizens' measures ofpolice effectiveness(Eck& Rosenbaum,1994).
To the extent that the public and police perception ofthe problem differ,the police will
continue to be ineffective where it perhaps counts the most—in the eyes ofthe citizens

whom they serve and upon whom they are dependentfor the majority oftheir support.

Therefore,in order to allow officers to focus oh citizen-perceived problems,a system of
officer performance evaluation rewarding this approach becomes imperative.

In conclusion,for COP to be effectively implemented,three components of
management structure must be instituted simultaneously. Moving toward
decentralization and pushing decision making authority outto the district and line levels

cannot work without providing the proper tools(information and training)to those who
will now be expected to function in ways to which they are not accustomed. Similarly,
even ifprovided with the necessary tools and authority to use them,unless officers are

first liberated from the constraints ofcountless rules,regulations,and a"mistake
avoidance" mentality,they will be reluctant to exercise their new authority.

Even though there may general agreement about these necessary changes,there
has been little consensus onjust how to go about implementing them (Wilkinson &

Rosenbaum,1994). Police organizations and culture have proven quite resistant to
change and continue to befuddle many administrators who have tried to innovate and
lead their organizations in new directions(Greene,Bergman,& McLaughlin, 1994). In
spite ofthe daunting odds,many continue to press ahead and some have met with
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measured success. It is from the trials and errors ofothers to which we turn for an

imderstanding ofwhat strategies have offered the most promise thus far.

Implementation Strategies

Trojanowicz& Bucqueroux(1990)suggest that implementation attempts at
community policing must be department-wide endeavors in order to insure succes$.
They reason that successful implementation must be preceded by education and

awareness;that without everjmne in the departmentijnderstanding how conimunity
policing can benefit them personally,the effort remains vulnerable to failure stemming
from internal resistance and lack ofsupport. Ifhistory can serve as a guide,then these

claims are well foxmded as it has been suggested by some that internal resistance to
decentralization from mid-level management was the primary cause ofthe downfall of

the Team Policing efforts ofthe 1970's,often noted as the precursor to COP(Roberg,
1994;Rosenbaum & Lurigio, 1994). As mentioned,others have even expanded the
notion ofdepartment-wide implementation by incorporating the community in the
education process. Pointing to a citizenry which has been conditioned over many years
to perceive the police as the crime fighters,some researchers make the claim that any

divergence from this stereotypical role tends to foster confusion and mistrust(Eck &
Spellman, 1994;Sadd & Grinc, 1994). And while the ideal commimity policing
program would involve a complete shift in philosophy,both for the department and the
community,getting to that point does not happen all at once. In fact,researchers and

practitioners alike advocate a piecemeal approach to managing the necessary changes
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(Brown,1989;Roberg,1994;Rosenbauni etal., 1994; Wycoff& iSkogan, 1994).
Sparrow(1988)draws a particularly helpful analogy comparing the typical police
departmentto a heavily laden tractor-trailer which caimot be handled like a sports car

when negotiating changes in direction, His point is well summarized in the following
statement:

Implementing community policing is not a simple policy change that can be
effected by issuing a directive through normal channels. For the police it is an
entirely different way oflife. The task facing the police chiefis nothing less
than to change the fundamental culture ofthe organization,(p.2)

Roberg(1994)stresses the import^ce ofa solid foundation for change before making
the move to community policing. He argues thatthe operational philosophy of
community policing is such a radical departure from traditional policing that it requires
skills and knowledge many police department persoimel are simply lacking. The key,
then,is a clear understanding ofdepartmental strengths and limitations

followed

up by action which willbring the departmentto the point where it will be able to make
the change. Rosenbaum et al.(1994),as well, talk about"organizational readiness"
and the need for having the necessary structure, policies, procedures,knowledge,and

skills in place before making the move to a community policing philosophy. Others
seem to agree with these views in positing that it may well take a generation or longer

before a department can really make the switch to community policing (Moore,1994).
Choices for Change
Underlying all ofthese cautions for change is an implicit assumption that there

must be aperceived needfor change on the part ofall involved before they will
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actively support,or at least not resist,the change. In order to create this perception that
change is necessary, many have followed a two-phase approach recommended by
Brown(1989). The first phase involves small program changes or demonstration

projects which serve the pmpose ofshowing what is possible,not only to those within
the department,but to those outside as well,thereby making evident the possibility of
different approaches to the same problems. This phase also indirectly incorporates

Sparrow's(1988)recommendations of exposing the defects ofthe current system and
bringing outside sources ofpressure to bear on the department. The second phase

involves a fuller implemehtation ofthe hew philosophy by expanding the test programs
to include the infrastructure ofthe entire department suggesting the need to build a
strong foundation first and integrate new programs one step at a time.

A review ofthe current literature reveals that most attempts to implement
community policing have generally followed some rough form ofBrown's two-phase
approach. In Joliette,Illinois, a two-year demonstration program first restricted the
implementation effort to one specific group or unit,and then expanded to include Other

units in the second year. Using the Evanston,Illinois, police department as a control
group,a pre-posttest analysis ofthe program showed some(more the exception than the

rule)positive changesin officerjob satisfaction, perceptions ofcommunity policing,
and perceptions ofproblem-solving skills. Rather than finding any fault with
methodology or theory,the analysts concluded thatthe less than optimal results could

be largely attributed to the relative newness ofthe program and the need to yet attain the

"critical mass"necessary for sustained institutionalization(Rosenbaum et al., 1994).
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In Seattle, Washington,a siniilar approach was followed and resulted in such

great success that the citizens subsequently passed an initiative which provided the
necessary funding and resources for city-wide implementation. As previously
mentioned,at least part ofthe greater measure ofsuccess in the Seattle program could
be attributed to the very high level ofcommunity involvement in program development.
One other lesson from the Seattle experience was the identification ofa four-stage

process ofrelationship building between citizens and police officers/administrators.
The first stage was largely defined by citizen's venting their fhistrations with and

challenging the traditional police approaches to the crime problem. The second stage
settled into an exchange ofinformation and ideas which facilitated organization,

planning,and relationship building. The third stage was coined the"success"stage in
that it consisted ofimplementation ofplanned actions. The successes ofthe third stage
seemed to cement the police citizen relationship as well as commitmentto the

community policing approach. The final stage involved creating mechanisms and
otherwiseplanniug forlongtermstability(National lnstituteofJustice, 1992). While

this four stage developmental process involved the citizens and police ofSeattle,this
method may also apply to the process ofinternal change within police departments. In

particular,the challenging in stage one seems to be a necessary step in overcoming the
resistance ofpersoimel to any proposed changes.
From another perspective,there has been at least one departmentto date which
has successfiilly implemented community policing from the approach suggested by
Roberg(1994);that is,laying the organizational foimdation before attempting to
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implement community policing in any measure. The Madison,Wisconsin,police
department's focus onestablishing quality management principles before community
policing,as previously mentioned,produced favorable results in the commimity without

emphasizing any comrnunity projects, Their plulosophy,captured in the department's
motto, "Closer to the People: Quality From the Inside, Out"and the results obtained
justthrough creating a new management culture supportthe logical fit between quality
management principles and the philosophy ofconununity policing With its emphasis on
customer service(Wycoff& Skogan, 1994,p. 373). Furthermore, while the Madison

approach did not result in a perfectly smooth transition; it was regarded by the
evaluators as"one ofthe least tumultuous[changes] we have witnessed"(p.382). The
Madison approach ofdeveloping a new management style first also makes sense
because departments which choose to implement community policing and are intent

on sticking with it will,at some point, be forced to adopt the quality management
philosophies simply because the goals and processes ofsuccessful community policing
demand it.

In spite ofthe gargantuan task of successfully changing organizational culture
and structure, it seems evident that COP is the wave ofthe future. Even those who

question its usefulness admitthat the evidence is not all negative and recognize the

successes achieved in certain quarters(Buerger, 1994). However,a review ofthe

existing literature does not support the notion that COP is the panacea which many
seem to believe it is while the difficulty encountered by those attempting to implement
COP should warn others that it is certainly no quick-fix either. In addition, nothing in
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the literature suggests that COP can(or should)be implemented in every type ofsetting
or all departments. Particularly in the military commimity,the question ofCOP's
applicability or tenability remains unanswered.
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Chapter 4

Coimnunily Policing in The Military Epviroiiinent:
Square Pegs for Round Holes?

The assumption that community policing is an equally appropriate solution for
all types ofcrime is as naive as the presumption that it can be(or should be)

implemented with equal success in all communities. Particularly in the military
community we find a situation where not only are the crime problems ofa different
magnitude,but the community dynamics are unique as well. In Order to explore the
issue of COP's applicability in the military community, it will be helpful to imderstand

some ofthe unique characteristics of military policing,its mission,and the environment
in which it Operates. We begin with a brief sketch ofmilitary policing's roots.

Military Policing: A BriefHistory
Dating back to the 11th century,the tradition ofthe military police has been to

protect the government's(or Sovereign's)riches and maintain order among the ranks of
the soldiers as suggested by the following charter issued to the Provost Marshall in 1629
by King Charles I:
The Provost must have a horse allowed him and some soldiers to attend him

and all the rest commanded to obey and assist or else the Service will suffer;
for he is but one man and must correct many and therefore he cannot be beloved.

And he must be riding from one Garrison to another to see the soldiers do no
outrage nor scath the country. (Air Force Regulation[APR]125-3,1977,p. 1-1)
On the American continent,the first military police unit dates back to the time of
the Revolutionary War and was organized along the lines of a regular Continental
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Army company. Although soldiers from time to time were assigned duties normally
assumed by military police,and the military was often the only recourse pertaining to
matters oflaw enforcementfor settlers ofthe western US,the next official formation of

a military police unit would not Occur again until the time ofthe Civil War(Wright,
1992). Those who served as military police dining the Civil War were granted broad

authority in discharging their law enforcementfunctions and could call on any soldier,
citizen,constable,sheriff,or police officer to assistthem(APR 125-3,1977).

The emerging pattern ofjfprmally organizing military police units during times
ofnational or international conflict in order to fulfill a specific need or mission,

continued with most units"hastily activated...with ho special supervision or technical
training"through the end of WWI (APR 125-3,1977). It was not until WWII thata
centrally directed Provost Marshall was once again formally established,and not until
1948,following the creation ofthe United States Air Porce(as distinguished from the

US Army Air Corps which had existed until 1947),that the Air Police were formed and
professionalization ofthe force began in earnest.
At the time ofits creation,the mission ofthe Air Police was specified as(1)the

protection ofall Air Porce installations,equipment,and military information;(2)the

operation ofall confinement facilities; and,(3)the enforcement ofdiscipline,conduct,

and military courtesies(APR 125-3,1977). Pollowing the Korean War,the need for a
strong Air Base defense plan was identified and the Air Police were charged with the
primary responsibility for its development and implementation,thus further expanding

the role and mission ofthe Air Police. Coupled with the urgency ofprotecting the
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nation's combat-ready weapon systems and nuclear arsenal during the ensuing Cold
War years,the Air Police mission was rechanneled with security for these important
resources taking the top priority. In 1960,the title ofAir Provost Marshall was changed
to Director of Security and Law Enforcement and in 1966,the Air Police became the
Security Police—^both title changes more reflective ofthe redefined mission ofthe
force.

During the Vietnam War the need for a whole-base defense concept was realized
and the necessary changes were made to build security plans around installations rather
than around weapon systems. In 1971,a division ofresponsibilities occurred when the
Security Police career field was separated into two distinct categories—security and
law enforcement. This separation offunctions allowed for greater professionalization
through specialization and allowed commanders to provide a higher level of traditional
law enforcement services as well as security by formally identifying the dual roles and
missions ofthe AF Security Police.

Todav's Securitv Police Organization

The typical Security Police squadron today is similar to its civilian police
counterpart in both structure and function. Strongly centralized in administration,the
chain ofcommand is clear and its use is strongly encouraged and enforced. Standards

ofconduct as well as regulations governing procedures,authority, and responsibilities
are routinely controlled using a rigorous system ofrecurring practical evaluations and

testing. Communication within squadrons is mostly top-down,although formal
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programs to facilitate bottom-up communication have been part and parcel ofmost
organizations for a number of years. Efforts at more bottom-up and lateral

communication have greatly increased since implementation ofa Quality Air Force
program in the early 1990s that includes training for all personnel and formal evaluation
for all imits and is based on Total Quality Management philosophies tThe Quality
Approach. 1993). While the mission ofany given SP squadron has been formally
divided between security and law enforcement since 1971, the two areas have never

been completely divergent because of the symbiotic relationship between security and
law enforcement in providing for the overall safety and quality oflife ofall military
personnel. Over the past several years,however,some economies ofscale have been
realized through the consolidation of security control centers and law enforcement

control centers into one security police control center with dispatchers certified in both
security and law enforcementfunctions and the dual certification ofsecurity specialists
who now regularly augmenttheir law enforcement cormterparts. The primary
differences between the typical SP squadron and its civilian counterpeut can be found in

this multi-faceted mission or role ofthe SP unit. While the civiliem departmentfocuses
largely on law enforcement,SP units are responsible for security and Air Base Defense

with traditional law enforcement being one subcomponent ofthis greater goal.

The Military Community

Similar to the traditional police model,the SP philosophy heis embraced the
notion ofthe police as crime fighters, but perhaps not to the extent ofcivilian
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departments because offour unique characteristics ofthe environment within which the
SP units operate. First,the typical Air Force installation is a closed environment

inhabited by a large contingent of "citizens" who are also military personnel specially
trained to operate in stressful and unusual contingency situations,often in direct support
oflaw enforcement and security operations. As such,the SP have not only the

authority to order other military persoiinel to assist them under certain conditions,they
also use this authority on a regular basis. Even during normal operations,security
awareness exercises and other law enforcement related scenarios,such as anti-robbery

exercises,are carried out with all participating players—whether ajetengine technician
or a bank teller—evaluated on their responses.
Second,the closed environment ofthe military community also allows for

tighter control over who is allowed access to the commimity. Consequently,both the
volume and assortment ofcrimes committed are reduced by precluding those with a

higher propensity toward criminal conductfrom transiting the installation. This"border
control" mechanism actually works in both directions; that is,in addition to preventing
unauthorized individuals from entering the installation, military commanders also have
the authority to expel troublemakers or personnel who are found guilty ofany number
ofcrimes or other violations. While civilian communities exercise a form of"border

control" as well through incarceration ofserious offenders,the military community
regularly prevents individuals from transiting the base confines for much less serious

offenses. Thus,by intervening earlier,the military community is somewhat shielded
from more serious criminal activity than neighboring civilian communities. In the case
51

ofmilitary personnel,the offender may simply be discharged and his/her privileges to

access the base revoked. In a situation where dependents ofmilitary personnel residing
in base housing are found to be the source of problems, the family may lose their right

to government housing and be asked to find domicile outside the installation confines.
And while the family may be allowed to enter the base as they desire, the individual
dependent(s)identified as the problem source(s)may have their base access privileges
permanently revoked,thereby ensuring a low rate ofon-base recidivism.

Taken together,this ability to control access to military commimities
significantly reduces installation crime rates when compared to neighboring civilian
communities(Table One provides illustrative data comparing March AFB with

neighboring Riverside,CA). The considerably lower crime rates consequently diminish
the need for extraordinary crime fighting measures and greatly increases the flexibility

ofthe SP squadrons to initiate crime prevention or other non-traditional law
enforcement programs.

1992 Part OneIndex CrimesPer 100,000 Population
murder

Rape

Robbery

Assault

Burglary

Larceny

GTA

Riverside,CA

10

55

497

925

1872

3703

1491

March AFB,CA

0

0

0

202

18

1903

64

Location

Table One
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A third unique characteristic ofthe military community is the difference
between the young adult population when compared to its civilian counterpart.

Specifically,the group is made up ofindividuals who have voluntarily chosen tojoin
the military and therefore have a personal interest in making the best oftheir

opportunities. For many young officers and enlisted personnel,the military is a chosen
career;for others,it is a stepping stone. In both situations,however,there exists
considerable motivation to make the best ofthe present circumstances in order to further

one's career, whether that be in the military or not. In addition, the military young
adult is more limited in his/her individual freedoms. While the military does not
completely control an individual's life,it does exert substantial influence over both on-

duty as well as off-duty conductthrough the attachment ofvery clear consequences to
conformity or nonconformity with military values and culture. The strong military
culture,supervisor involvement in one's life, and the personal investment individuals

have in their careers provide powerful encouragementfor adherence to the principles
and values espoused by the military community. The encouragement or motivation to
conform with community norms serves as a strong informal control that diminishes the

need for formal control mechanisms such as the police. The stronger these informal
controls,the less the need for formal policing.
The fourth peculiarity ofthe normal AF installation is found in a structure where
all public service agencies(police,fire, civil engineering,community services)are

grouped to function in concert under one commander(Support Group Commander)and
work toward ajoint goal ofimproving the quality oflife for all base residents and

personnel. Even outside ofthe Support Group,the installation as a whole emphasizes a
team effort in all undertakings recognizing the fact that everyone On the installation
plays an important role in overall mission accomplishment. This teamwork approach
serves as a shield against the parochialism that is endemic in most highly specialized,
professional organizations. Thus,the COP goal of casting the police officer as

problem solver and facilitator is superseded in the Air Force environment by investing
an individual ofhigher rank with the necessary authority and express responsibility of
community problem solver. While in the civilian community this responsibility

typically rests with the Mayor,the ability to influence other agencies to work together in

order to achieve a common goal is stronger for the military commander because ofa
more direct and clearly defined chain ofcommand. Not only are there significant
economies ofscale achieved through grouping under one individual all ofthose

agencies responsible for the military community citizens' quality oflife,the power this
individual wields over those under his/her command facilitates a level ofteamwork that

few cities have been able to achieve in their efforts at community policing.

While some may be wary ofvesting one individual with such a high level of
power and authority, the overarching mission ofeach installation, which is not directly
tied to any one service group or agency, serves as an effective check and balance on the

authority and power ofthe Support Group Commander. In reality,the more the Support
Group Commander can facilitate agency interaction and teamwork toward improving
the quality oflife,the closer that commander comes to realizing the COP goal of

increasing community problem solving skills within all public service agencies.
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Implementing COP: Weak Tncentives

While on the one hand it would seem thatthe unique environment and functional
structure ofthe typical AF installation provide for a community highly amenable to
Commimity Oriented Policing,it is nevertheless unlikely that COP as it is defined in the

current literature will successfully replace traditional policing as a new philosophy

primarily because what COP hopes to achieve with respect to commimity organizing
and crime prevention,the AF community has already realized. To a large extent,as
pointed out by Skogan(Buerger, 1994),COP assumes a broken down community; a
community that has become disorganized following the disintegration oftraditional
informal social controls. To the extent that this breakdown has not occurred in AF

communities,those communities already resemble the ideal COP community and as a
result ofthis,there is no pressing need for significant changes to occur with regard to
COP.

In Search ofa Need

As other civilian departments have come to realize, before being able to alter the

culture ofa highly centralized bureaucratic organization such as a police department
there must first exist a strongly perceived need for change. In the military environment

depicted here,the mission and role ofthe SP is not derived solely from the image ofthe
crime fighter, but rather from the overall mission ofthe Air Force and each individual

installation. Therefore,the need for change would most likely have to be driven by

events or circumstances that prove themselves detrimentalto mission accomplishment.
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While severe crime problems certainly could have a negative impact on the

overall mission by having a detrimental effect on the quality oflife ofthose who reside
and work at the military installation, the unique characteristics ofthe military

conummity combine to produce relatively benign crime rates. One may argue that

crime problems could grow to the pointthat changes would be demanded;however,this
scenario is imlikely in light ofthe niilitary community's strong informal social control
mechanisms that effectively reduce the levels ofcrime on AF installations. With a

strong discipline ethic,a philosophy that encourages—even requires—-supervisors to
become very involved in subordinates' personal lives and problems,the"border

control" capability ofAir Force installations,and the ability ofcommanders to punish
and/or even expel serious offenders from the installation,the need for formal police
action is significantly reduced. The combination ofthese factors creates a community
that is not only well suited for COP,but in reality is already exercising the COP

philosophy. As one scholar pointed out,"Anticrime organizations are often most
successful in commimities that need them least...[and]least common where they

appear to be most needed—in low-income,heterogeneous,deteriorated,renting, high
tumOver,high-crime areas"(Skogan 1988,p.42,45). Air Force communities are no
exception to this observation.

Implementing Tactical Change in The SP Unit

Although there are many existing similarities in structure and methodology
between civilian and military police units,this does not necessarily mean that there are
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parallels in managing change in both types ofdepartments. Some ofthe more salient

issues and problems with which many civilian police agencies are currently grappling
do not equally apply to Air Force SP units wishing to engage in COP programs. Of

particular significance are the issues ofdecentralization,training,and evaluation and
their applicability to the SP imit.
The geography oftypical Air Force installations diminishes the need for
physical decentralization ofthe police department. The relatively small size ofmost
bases enables easy access to the police for base residents and employees. Air Force
communities also offer citizens direct access to the highest levels ofleadership through

a variety ofmechanisms,the most common being a Commander's Hot Line which
allows people to lodge any variety ofcomplaints or simply ask questions. Accessibility
is also increased by virtue ofthe fact that Chiefs ofPolice,as well as many police
officers,routinely live within the base community. This phenomenon,rare in urban
police departments,opens up the police rank and file to the informal accountability
(accountability to the community)that is cited as an important ingredient in policecommunity relations in rural communities by Weisheit, Wells,and Falcone(1994). In
addition,this informal accoimtability serves to curb line officer discretion somewhat as

police officers are held not only accountable to their supervisors, but to the community
residents with whom they live and work daily. The resulting environment closely

resembles a small,rural town where citizens play a larger role in community affairs and
differs markedly from the sprawling,urban city with its imposing levels ofbureaucracy
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that somewhat shield police officers from direct public access and scrutiny. As noted

by Eisenstein(Weisheit et al. 1994,p.553):
A major explanation for the high degree ofpolice discretion found in urban
areas is the low visibility ofpolice actions. In smaller communities the
actions ofpolice officers are known to most ofthe population thanks to the
effectiveness ^d extensiveness ofinformal communication networks;
there they are more highly visible. As a result,small town police enjoy less
latitude in deviating from dominant community values,

While the nature ofthe AF Community lessens the need for physical
decentralization ofthe SP unit, functional decentralization is also less likely to ocCur

unless it is fully supported by the highest levels ofinstallation leadership. The military
culture places high levels of responsibility and accountability on its senior officers and
senior non-commissioned officers. Mistakes made byjunior enlisted personnel,or
junior officers,are routinely answered for by supervisors. This situation creates an
environment where individual discretion is sharply curtailed at the patrol officer level so
that commanders and mid-level managers are able to maintain stricter control over line

officer behavior. While this scenario is similar to thatfound in most civilian police
departments,it is perhaps more acutely felt in the military environment because ofthe

direct chain between police commanders and senior base leadership. Leadership lapses
on the part ofthose vested with coinmand authority are not tolerated well and can

quickly lead to career ending performance evaluations.

Unlike decentralization,training and evaluation issues relevant to the civilian

police department apply to the SP squadron as well. Air Force training occurs on at
leasttwo levels begirming with initial Air Force-level training at Technical Training
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schools following completion of the initial Air Force Basic Training. While this

training covers the basics ofpolice work, it does not include the various skills or
methods dictated by the variety ofmissions found across Air Force installations. New
recruits,then, must undergo further training once they arrive at their newly assigned

destinations in order to be successfully integrated into their respective units. Moreover,

because ofthe fluid nature ofmilitary life, which results in reassignment to other
installations every few years for most personnel,continued training—even for seasoned

police officers—is a constant necessity. This multi-tiered and continuing training
becomes a concern in that inconsistencies between training levels or locations could
breed confusion and/or cynicism on the part ofpolice officers and make
implementation ofany desired changes more difficult. Thus,Air Force level

coordination oftraining in both operating philosophies and tactics becomes important
regardless ofthe chosen direction.
Equitable implementation ofevaluation systems,as well,is benefited by Air
Force level control. Because SP officers and enlisted personnel compete against all
other Air Force SP officers and enlisted personnel for promotion and career
advancement opportunities,similar criteria must be rewarded equally across the board.

Unless implementation ofCOP tactics is approached from an Air Force level,the
reward system necessary to motivate SP personnel to change to a new operating
philosophy will not exist. Without the necessary reward-based motivation,successful
implementation ofany program(s)becomes an insurmountable task. Finally, efforts at

revising existing training and evaluation systems should be attacked simultaneously and
59

in a complementary fashion.Implementation ofa new evaluation and reward system

cannot be effective without the necessary training to support the desired roles and
behaviors. Conversely,even with proper training,an evaluation and reward system that
is not reflective ofnewly desired behaviors/actions will not provide the necessary
motivation for people to implement the desired changes or use the training they have
been given.
In short,although the typical SP organization resembles the traditional police
department,both in structure and culture,it also operates in a significantly different

environment that strongly curtails the need for any radical changes in departmental
culture or operating philosophy. The unique characteristics ofthe Air Force installation

provide for a sense ofcommunity rarely found outside ofrural America. Geographic
boimdaries, which are controlled effectively by the Security Police,coupled with a
population which is made more homogenous by the commonality ofthe military culture
and installation mission,create an environment in stark contrast to the inner city,
ghettoized neighborhoods described by Wilson & Kelling(1982); neighborhoods that
have been blamed for many ofthe more severe crime problems faced by contemporary
urban police departments. Absent any pressing social or political need for change,the

probability that true reform at the strategic level could be(or need be)successfully
achieved within the average SP unit is remote. However,just because there may be no
pressing crime-related or social issues across AF communities which would drive a

massive reform effort toward Community Oriented Policing,there is a need for
continued community oriented actions or activities that will preserve the strong sense of
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community that does exist. In fact, the Air Force Security Police already performs
many functions which arguably fall under the rubric ofCommunity Oriented Policing

and may fill some ofthis need for continued community oriented activities.
Additionally, recent Air Force-level changes in management philosophies bode well for
continued development ofsome ofthe more important components ofthe COP
philosophy.

Air Force Community Oriented Policing

Meagher(1985)found that community size impacts the type ofservice provided
by police departments. Following a continuum ofsorts,smaller town police
departments were found to focus more on crime prevention while larger departments
emphasized law enforcement and arrest rates. Flanagan(1985)cited similar results in
another study showing that whereas large cities tended to expect police to concentrate

on being crime fighters,small towns expected a wider variety ofservices and functions
from their police departments. In light ofthe evidence that AF communities most
closely parallel rural towns,it is not surprising to find that AF SP units have
traditionally provided a range ofservices which are responsive to the desires and needs

ofthe communities they serve. A briefexploratory survey ofnine AF SP units
produced some telling results with regard to COP in the Air Force. The survey was
conducted telephonically with the senior Law Enforcement Non-Commissioned Officer
(or most knowledgeable NCO with regard to COP)at each ofthe nine selected units.
Ofthe nine units,two were pending base closure within the following nine months,a

fact which somewhat limited their ability to perform any more than the absolute

minimum law enforcement support. Two other units were facing significant—albeit
temporary—personnel shortages which also affected their capability to perform other

than essential services; yet each ofthese imits was planning to resume COP programs
and/or otherwise expand existing efforts. The following discussion does not presume to
cover all programs or efforts which may be ongoing at the selected installations. It does
however provide an overview ofthe kinds ofprograms which are typical at most AF

installations as well as some insight into the current perception ofwhat actually
constitutes COP.

Findings

Without first differentiating between COP as a philosophy or as a tactical
program,six ofthe nine units queried indicated they had formally adopted Commxmity
Oriented Policing. The three units which had not done so cited personnel shortfalls as
the primary reason for not making more ofan effort to implement COP. When
questioned what component(s)they had implemented,bike patrol was the answer 100

percent ofthe time suggesting that there existed a perception in the minds ofthose
questioned that bike patrolling was tantamount to Community Oriented Policing. When

pressed for other programs which might be considered as COP,the respondents listed
several, all of which are discussed below.

In the realm offormal programs,AF SP units have aggressively pursued
activities in resource protection and crime prevention for many years. Resource

Protection is a formally evaluated program covering the"business"or operational side
ofan AF installation. Typical activities incltide insuring cornpliance with AF directives

governing funds and other non-priority resources(such as weapons)through training of

personnel who have been delegated responsibility over these resources and periodic
inspection oftheir facilities and agency programs.
Crime Prevention programs(also formally evaluated),on the other hand,are
directed more toward the base residents although they also encompass elements ofthe

base business community. Typical duties for those assigned to Crime Prevention office
include the publishing oftimely newspaper articles identifying current crime trends and

suggesting ways individuals can protect themselves against becoming victims;training
the various unit managers in proper crime prevention techniques for their respective
units; conducting home crime prevention surveys in an effort to identify vulnerabilities
and help citizens recognize ways in which they can better"crime-proof their
residences; organizing and monitoring Neighborhood Watch programs; administering

the installation D.A.R.E program; briefing all newly assigned personnel in local crime
problems and crime prevention techniques; and managing the installation Product

Identification program that allows individuals to have valuable belongings engraved and
registered in case oftheft. The individuals selected as Crime Prevention officers also

have the opportunity to undergo formal training.
Many proponents ofCOP have stressed that department-wide implementation is

necessary to insure a successful shift in departmental culture. While the Resource
Protection and Crime Prevention programs do notinvolve all SP personnel in the unit.

they are nevertheless indicative ofa philosophy ofcatering to the needs ofthe

community—whether that be the business or residential community. In addition,they
certainly involve services and activities that are not considered as normal law
enforcement and surely do not fit the stereotypical "Joe Friday"image ofcrime fighter.

All ofthe nine surveyed bases had active Crime Prevention and Resource Protection
programs. Furthermore,because the programs are formally evaluated(Air Force wide),
it can be safely assumed that all AF SPimits have similar programs.
Other non-traditional police activities in which all nine bases engaged included
after-hours building checks(rattling door knobs;checking windows), stray animal

control,bike patrols,and foot patrols. Building checks and stray animal control are
activities, like Crime Prevention and Resource Protection,that began independently of
the current COP fervor and have been pursued over the years because they continue to
serve a useful purpose in the community. Bike patrols are an attempt to move the
police officer in certain areas to a bicycle,thereby increasing community accessibility to
the police officer. A variation ofthe foot beat ofan earlier era, bike patrols offer greater
mobility for the police officer while maintaining the ability to build the rapport with

citizens that disappeared with the advent ofthe patrol vehicle and rapid response goals.
While once attempted at some AF installations in years past,bike patrols have become

enormously popular and owe their resurrection to the COP movement. Initiated at
Major Command level,bike patrols are now 100 percent supported in at least two ofthe
Air Force's eight Major Commands. Survey respondents indicated that feedback from

both police officers and supervisors as well as community residents,installation
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leadership,and other installation personnel has been virtually unanimous in its support
ofthe bike patrol program. Thefew negative comments concerning the program came
from line supervisors who complained under conditions ofmeager staffing that it was

difficult to post bike patrols in addition to other required patrols, or that bike patrols

"robbed"them oftheir ability to perform "real" police work—a comment not
uncommon in civilian departments which have tried to implement components ofCOP.
Six ofthe nine installations surveyed indicated their bike patrol officers received formal
training from local civilian police agencies that provided the service for their own

officers as well. Ofthe three units that did not currently have a formal training
program,two cited personnel shortfalls and one was closing within the nexttwo
months; the two with personnel shortfalls indicated they had a plan to begin formal
training when they could afford to do so. All six ofthe nine units surveyed that
indicated they had bike patrols indicated that bike patrol officers were permanently
assigned to specified beats, while four ofthose six units attested to having a dedicated
bike patrol section whose members worked as a separate unit from the remainder ofthe

force. While this type ofstructural arrangement has proven problematic for some
civilian police departments,none ofthose surveyed cited any problems stemming from
the splitting ofthe force. In fact, all units noted an overage ofvolunteers to work bike

patrol duties indicating that line officers had a favorable impression ofthat particular
program.

Foot patrols at all nine installations were used mostly to apply more police
presence in areas identified through crime analysis as problem zones. Several indicated
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foot patrols were used to augment bike patrols on a random basis and thatfoot patrols
would increase in quantity over bike patrols during the winter months because of

inclement weather. As with bike patrols,all respondents mentioned similarly positive

feedback concerning foot patrols while those who noted some dissatisfaction cited the
same reasons line supervisors gave concerning bike patrols.

Discussion

The findings ofthis briefexploratory survey highlight some interesting points.
First,it seems that personnel viewed bike patrols and COP as synonymous. When
asked iftheir unit had formally adopted COP,those responding affirmatively cited bike

patrols as the program related to COP. Even those units that did not claim any formal
adoption ofCOP noted they were conducting bike patrols. Next,the virtual
institutionalization ofCrime Prevention and Resource Protection programs supports the

notion that those programs that are evaluated and rewarded from higher Headquarters
are those which receive attention at the unit level. This would also explain the

popularity ofthe bike patrol program which has been similarly initiated at the Major
Command level. Finally,simileir resistance can be expected from some within the SP

organization to changes ofany kind. The comments about"real" police work are
indicative ofofficers holding a professional policing philosophy. Although there are
programs conducted that wouldjustifiably be termed as COP programs,the
philosophies of professional policing may still be well-ingrained in the minds ofmany

SP persormel and this factor should be considered when formulating plans for further
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integration ofCOP programs. On the other hand, all nine iinits said they had no lack of
volunteers for their bike patrol program. This popularity might indicate a willingness

on the part ofthe line officer(who are traditionally among the yomigest in an AF SP
unit as opposed to the line supervisors who are more seasoned)to try different methods

ofpolicing. The program's popularity may also,however,be due to the novelty ofthe
program,which would mean that in die long run its popularity would likely decline.
In summary,while AF installations do not exhibit the same driving needs that
have spawned the growth ofCOP in the civilian world,they nonetheless remain a fertile
environment for COP tactics. The similarities between rural towns and AF

communities mean that many police activities that do not fall under the contemporary
COP vocabulary are nevertheless actively pursued because they provide services desired
by the community and, in some cases,are demanded by higher authority. In this sense,
much like the rural towns which have performed COP for years—although they may
have not been recognized as doing so(Weisheit et al., 1994)—^AF SP units have

performed components ofCOP for many years as well. As such,full implementation
ofCOP as a new operating philosophy may not be necessary in AF communities

because ofthe different nature ofthe community,the unique demands ofthe SP
mission,and the services which are already provided. In reality, COP in the military

community is not a case offitting square pegs into round holes—the proper fit has
already existed for some time.
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Chapter Five
Discussion and Recommendations
Summary

Tracing the history ofurban policing, we find that changes in law enforcement
were preceded by events or changes in society that first created an atmosphere

conducive to change. The migration offarm laborers to the urban areas of 19th
Century England and the subsequent concentration ofcrime and disorder in those areas

triggered a growing sense ofvmeasiness among those with power to initiate changes.
Absent that sensation ofgrowing disorder,one could argue that Peel's Bobbies may
^
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have yet been well into the future. Similarly,void ofthe rampant corruption oflocal

politicians in early urban America and the havoc they created among America's first
urban police departments,one can legitimately argue thatthe professionalization of
policing may not have matured quite as soon as it did. Even once initiated,the
professionalization ofpolice work did notfollow a steady,straight-line evolution either;

rather,it wasjolted and pushed along an unpredictable and ever-changing course.
Improved technology,tenacious leadership by afew key individuals,evolving
management principles in the business world,and the omnipresent need for law
enforcement in urban areas kept the movement progressing.

In a like manner.Community Oriented Policing found its genesis in issues

relevant to society at large in the 1960s. The Civil Rights movement,urban umest,
overly aggressive police tactics, and the distancing ofpolice officers from the public
they served combined to create a new impetus for change,slowly nudging away from
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the professional model ofpolicing. Similar to the road followed by the professional
model ofpolicing,GOP encountered its share ofstops and starts,sputters and surges.

Empirical research demonstrated some ofthe things that were wrong with the
professional model and its fundamental assumptions,new managementtechniques
offered options to the status quo ofpolice administration,and the changing face of
inner-city America provided the necessary set ofproblems which kept the questfor
altemative responses to the crime problem alive.
Underlying the changes which have occurred over the past 250 years ofthe

history ofpolicing is the factor ofneed. Largely creatures ofhabit, people are generally
loathe to make changes unless the first perceive that change is necessary and/or
desirable. Once the need for change makes itselfmanifest(even when that

manifestation may be an illusion) Americans have a demonstrated propensity for
reform. Consequently,when deliberating the change to COP,one must also give the

potency ofthe desire for change its due consideration in order to successfully predict an
outcome. Especially in attempting to change something as ingrained as organizational
or institutional culture,the impetus driving the change cannot be found impotent ifit is

expected to generate enough momentum to overcome the considerable inertia it faces.
Successful change must be dealt with systematically; all aspects ofform and function

must be carefully thought through lest the momentum fractures itselfon unanticipated
obstacles. While thejury is still out with respectto the future ofCOP in America's
urban police departments,there have been some significant strides made in directing
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change and achieving results and preliminary findings suggest that COP has a fighting
chance ofsuccessfiilly altering the status quo.
Whether or notthese same reforms can(or should)be successfiilly applied to the

Air Force Security Police is an entirely different question and requires examination of
the same,as well as some other,significant factors. Primarily,the question ofneed for

change is up for debate. Air Force communities,with the ability to control access
through effective border control mechanisms,the high degree ofinvestment which its
members have in maintaining community norms and upholding AF values,the

homogeneity ofcommunity,the small town atmosphere, and some ofthe other
similarities it shares with rural America result in significantly lower crime rates than
those found in America's urban areas. Consequently,the AF community environment

is at once ideal for COP programs and largely devoid ofthe need for COP as a new

philosophy. Certain aspects of the COP philosophy,however,should be applicable in
any community;even in the AF commimity which already embodies many
characteristics that the COP philosophy attempts to create,further enhancements are

nearly always desirable.

Specifically, since successful law enforcement has been

dependent on public support since the days before urban policing, aspects of

community policing designed to bring police officers and citizens closer together can

only improve a police department's ability to maintain order and solve crimes. Even in
commxmities where that police officer-citizen gap is not as great(or even nonexistent),

closer relations between police and citizens can only enhance crime control efforts and
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improve customer satisfaction, which in turn should raise the level ofsupport given the
police department.

While SP units have made great progress over the years in providing non
traditional law enforcement services,existing programs sometimes suffer by being

categorized as not being "real" police work. The police work orientation could be
enhanced by making clear to line officers and supervisors the significance ofproviding
these kinds ofservices. Recent attempts to integrate COP through the initiation of

bike patrols,as well,will take on more meaning as those implementing and managing
the changes come to understand the worth and positive side effects ofcommunity

oriented programs. For it is notthe fact that police officers move from the confines of
their patrol cars to the freedom ofthe sidewalks that gives worth and value to bike or

foot patrols,rather it is the underlying message that interaction between police and
community residents is desirable ifit raises the quality ofcommunity life. In reality,
with COP there is more at stake than higher arrest rates and lower crime rates; quality of
life is the relevant issue, whether that be addressed through order maintenance,

increased citizen involvementin crime control,greater involvement by all public service

agencies functioning in the community,enhanced police-community relations,or higher
arrest and lower crime rates.

The strides made in the Air Force in recent years toward Total Quality

Management dovetail well into the COP philosophy and quality oflife issues. The
principles learned through TQM training will automatically amplify the effort police
officers make in reaching out to their communities;and this without any specific focus
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on COP,as evidenced by the success enjoyed in the Madison,Wisconsin police

department(Wycoff& Skogan,1994). So,while the need for a change to COP may
not be as evident in AF communities as in many ofthe urban areas ofAmerica,the

desirability of a greater emphasis on certain aspects ofthe COP philosophy still exists.
In order for SP units to successfully enhance their current law enforcement services,
there are several areas ofconcern which warrant continued research and evaluation.

Recommendations

There seems to be an assumption on the part ofmany SP officers and enlisted

personnel that because SP units are similar in structure to urban police departments,that
they must also function like their civilian counterparts. While the professionalization of

police work generated by the early reforms has also benefited Air Force police efforts,a
clear understanding ofthe dissimilarities between SP units and the typical urban
department is also important. Through careful analysis ofthe dissimilarities between

the two types ofagencies. Commanders will then be better able to identify areas that

could(or should)not be realistically integrated or changed. Similarly,the study of

rural police departments and the various services provided by them is one area which
could strengthen the Air Force's ability to tailor future law enforcementtraining and
plan for any desired changes. Particularly,the notion ofmore citizen
inVolvement/control over some aspects ofpolice work as is foimd in many rural

departments should be further investigated in order to identify desirable ways of

enhancing the police-community partnership. The idea ofbringing community
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residents and police officers closer together and reorienting the crime fighting focus

toward problem solving in unison with community residents and other public service

organizations will tend to enhance any police tactics or strategies implemented. In the
end,understanding the nature ofthe AF SP unit,its mission,the contributions it already
makes,the unique characteristics ofthe AF community,and what activities are needed
in order to perpetuate the sense ofcommunity thus far experienced will help define the
appropriate course to follow.
Continued research ofthe COP philosophy and monitoring ofongoing

advancements will also aid those charged with developing training and other programs
at the Major Command or Air Force level in order to identify and maximize

implementation of those components ofCOP which would be most beneficial to the AF
community. Specifically,integrating COP with TQM principles would create the ideal

platform for continued education and training of SP persoimel. In a like manner,
careful evaluation ofongoing COP programs in the civilian community and close
working relationships with civilian departments will enable AF SP units to avoid
reinventing the wheel,especially in those situations where the wheel proves to be
defective. Additionally, critical evaluation ofnewly introduced programs,such as bike

patrols,is needed in order to establish the usefulness ofthese programs and thereby

clearly illustratejust why these new programs are being pursued. Both the SP units and
their civilian counterparts,particularly those in rural areas,may benefit fromjoint
training and education and may achieve some economies ofscale through mutual
interaction as well.
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Just as COP is not equally applicable to all civilian communities,it may not be
equivalently useful at all AF installations or even in all areas ofany given installation.
Especially in environments with a highly transient population,such as training bases
where some ofthe unique characteristics ofthe traditional AF commxmity do not exist,
there will be areas ofthe installation where COP programs may not be as useful.
Further research into what factors make an environment particularly well suited to COP

will help avoid wasting scarce resources and maximizing use ofthose resources where
they are needed the most.
In conclusion, better understanding the dynamics which have shaped and

continue to shape the role ofpolice in society will enable us to adapt those changes most

desirable while avoiding those which ultimately serve no useful purpose. Not only will
customer satisfaction rise(along with the attendant increases in support for the police),

butjob satisfaction should grow as well as officers better understand the purposes
behind the actions and changes they are asked to make. Similarly,a clear recognition of
the uniqueness ofthe AF community and an understanding that police work isjust one
small slice ofthe pie which determines a community's quality oflife will overcome
resistance to changes which move away from the traditional model ofpolicing.

Ignoring these realities,on the other hand, and not taking time to carefully analyze

what changes are necessary and achievable will inevitably lead to program frustration
and cynicism among the rank and file ofthe organization as administrators attempt to
implement ill-fitting or unobtainable programs.

74

As policing continues along its evolutionary path,Comhiunity Oriented Policing

philosophies and programs seem destined to be with us—both in the civilian as well as
the AF conimunity. As such,caution should be exercised by those in positions of
leadership to ensure thatthe strategies or tactics pursued are appropriate for the situation
in which they are meantto operate. While it has been suggested that COP philosophies
and programs have been part^d parcel OfAF SP operations for quite some time,the
degree to which this is true surely varies across AF installations and fluctuates with
changes in base and unit leadership. Because ofthe inherent variations among AF
Commands and installations,issues dealing with COP should be dealt with atthe

highest levels ofAF SP leadership in order to receive adequate and unit-level attention.
The findings presented here should be viewed as a laimch pad for further, more

in depth analysis and study,and not as the ultimate solution to imanswered questions

concerning COP mid the military environment. Particularly, more detailed research into
line persoimel knowledge regarding COP and the prevailing perception ofthe proper

role for the police in the AF community is encouraged as a starting pointthat will afford

a clearer understanding ofprecisely where the AF SP community stands in its
continuing evolution. Without a proper understanding ofwhere one is,it become
difficult to navigate the way to where one desires to be.

Ultimately,correct

imderstanding,garnered through careful research and analysis,should result in

thoughtful implementation ofadditional COP strategies or tactics and will enable AF
commanders to successfully lead their organizations through the gaxmtlet ofchange and

challenges that lay before them.
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APPENDIX A

Survey results

Individual Responses To Questions

Questions

Unit Unit Unit Unit Unit Unit Unit Unit Unit
3

4

5

6

No^

Yes

Yes

No^

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Not

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

1

2

Yes

Written Definition ofCOP?
Bike Patrol

Adopted COP?

8

9

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

Not^

Yes

7

Yet

Yet

Foot Patrol

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Crime Prevention Program
Resource Protection Prgm

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Neighborhood Watch
Town Meetings

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

D.A.R.E.

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Building Checks(After
hours;rattling doorknobs)
Stray Animal Control

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

N/A

No

Yes N/A

Yes

Yes N/A

Yes

Yes N/A

No

Yes N/A

Yes

Yes N/A

Yes

Do Bike Patrol Officers

Yes N/A

Yes

Yes N/A

Yes

Yes N/A

Yes

receive special training?
Support ofsupervisors for
Bike Patrol Program

Mix"^

N/A Pos

Pos N/A

Pos

Pos

Mix^

Pos

Enthusiasm for Bike Patrol

High

N/A

Are Bike Patrol Officers

No

assigned to special section?
Do Bike Patrol Officers

assigned permanent beats?

High High

N/A

High High High High

from Line Personnel

Support Received From

Pos

N/A Pos

Pos

N/A Pos° Pos N/A

Pos

N/A Pos

Pos

N/A

Pos

Installation Commanders

Type ofFeedback reeeived
from community residents

Pos

Pos

N/A Pos

^ Plans to implement COP programs when current personnel shortages are overcome.
^ Base slated for closure before end of 1995.

^ Plans to implement COP programs when current personnel shortages are overcome.
Cited biggest obstacle coming from mid-level supervisors who were forced to fill bike patrol positions
over normal patrols even though current staffing levels did not support the additional program.
^ See Footnote 4.

^ Hospital Commander investigating the possibility ofplacing one Emergency Medical Technician on
bicycle within the base housing area during certain hours to allow for swifter response in case ofinjury.
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